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Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000200060007-0
 THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

File: S/C IIM

Brigade

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

19 July 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Robert R. Bowie
 Deputy Director, National Foreign Assessment

FROM : [REDACTED]
 National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT : The Army Dissent Issue (U)

1. Attached for your inspection and approval is the final draft of the IIM on the Possible Presence of Soviet Ground Forces in Cuba. Changes and concurrences, with the large exception noted below, were handled telephonically during the day and I believe the agencies involved other than the Army will regard this as a fair and accurate reflection of their views. [REDACTED]

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2. The proposed Army footnotes are a different matter. The picture has changed somewhat since Bob Bowie filled you in and received your direction to exclude the nuclear site security force mission tick proposed by Army. I conveyed this decision to the Army rep who informed me that another Army LDX with revised language was on the way. Our LDXs broke down so I had to have the text of the proposed footnote dictated over the phone. It was accompanied by a long paragraph, which was read to me, citing chapter and verse of laws which forbid suppression of dissenting intelligence Agency views and enjoin the DCI to ensure that differing views are disseminated to policymakers, etc. (S)

3. The new footnote is less offensive and inflammatory than the two it replaces, but still quite far-fetched and dubiously germane to the discussion in the IIM.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, would point out that, although the mission of this Brigade is not clear, its presence in Cuba would provide the Soviets with a contingency force and would enhance their capability for power projection in the Western Hemisphere. If necessary, extra transport aircraft could be introduced into Cuba to deploy these troops to a crisis area. Should the Soviets decide to introduce nuclear weapons into Cuba this force could also be used to insure that appropriate security is provided.

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TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

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Nevertheless, since the Army has revised the language of the footnote you previously decided to reject and because the issue of right of dissent has been raised, I believe you will want an opportunity to review the new Army language before I go ahead and enforce your previous decision. (S)

4. Your options:

(a) Reject the footnote as before and publish the IIM as in the present draft with a footnote identifying those agencies with which it was coordinated and stating that ACSI, Department of the Army, does not concur. The ACSI, perhaps supported by General Tighe, will probably try to take you to court.

(b) Agree to include the footnote in which case it is essential that other agencies be informed of its content and offered the opportunity to refute it, which I am certain at least some of them will insist on doing. I might in that case attempt to draft a position reflecting the views of all agencies other than Army. This would take some time tomorrow and almost certainly would prevent the IIM from being distributed until Monday.

(c) Propose to ACSI the following substitute footnote drafted by Helene Boatner.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, believes that the above list of possible missions does not cover the full range of possibilities. In the interests of disseminating this IIM to policymakers in a timely fashion, the Director of Central Intelligence has directed that interagency discussion of the possibility of additional missions be deferred until the NFIB representatives meet again on the forthcoming IIM on the Soviet-Cuban military relationship.

This would permit the ACSI to indicate disagreement while you asserted your authority to channel the dispute into a more appropriate and less time-constrained channel. This would be an ideal solution, but I doubt very much that the ACSI would buy it, unless perhaps you dealt with him personally.

5. In any case, I will need to have your decision very quickly if we want to have any chance at all of disseminating an IIM tomorrow. I shall be phoning you at home this evening from the Ops Center to discuss this further and receive your instructions.


Attachment:
As Stated

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To refresh your memory the underlined is
the footnote language originally proposed
by the Army which has now been superceded
by the language in Paragraph 3 of my
memorandum.



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Date

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FORM 101 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

does either give us a basis for sizing the Soviet unit.
None of the more than 50,000 Cuban emigres who have visited the island in the last several months have reported any indication of a separate Soviet ground force unit in Cuba-- much less given us any indicators of size.

Missions

The mission of the Soviet unit could include any, some combination, or all of the following:

- Training for Soviet personnel.
- Training for Cuban personnel.
- Development of Soviet tactics and training for tropical areas.

-- A small but concrete commitment of Soviet military support for the Castro regime, which might be intended as the nucleus of an expanded Soviet military presence in time of crises. or for some future adventure elsewhere in Latin America.

insert The available evidence is compatible with any of these possibilities but inadequate to prove any of them.

Comment on Collection and Guidance

Efforts are under way to obtain more information on the presence of a Soviet ground force unit in Cuba.

used -- A Soviet unit of this size and type could also be used as a security force for nuclear weapon storage sites should the Soviets ever decide to reintroduce nuclear weapons into Cuba.